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Panpsychism and Neutral Monism: How to Make Up One’s Mind 
 
0. 
Chalmers has helpfully distinguished a slew of combination problems.1  His 
overall sense is apparently that constitutive Russellian panpsychism and 
constitutive Russellian panprotopsychism2 are broadly equally afflicted. I aim to 
show that panprotopsychism is actually in much better shape than panpsychism, 
once one takes their respective combination problems into account. 
Panpsychism’s distinctive combination problem, concerning the combination of 
subjects, reveals the theory as deeply unsatisfactory. The view I endorse—a form 
of panprotopsychism labeled ‘panqualityism’ by Chalmers—doesn’t face the 
subject combination problem. On panqualityism the world is ultimately 
constituted of quality-instances, where we can usefully think of these as 
unexperienced qualia—properties just like the qualia we experience, only 
without anyone experiencing them.3 But since panqualityism does without the 
panpsychist’s microsubjects, it must generate macrosubjectivity from scratch—
this opens a new arena of combination problems specific to forms of 
panprotopsychism. 
 
                                                        
1 See his paper in this volume. Some of these problems have been knocking around for a long 
time, as we’ll see. But it’s fair to say that no one so far has separated and clarified them in such a 
comprehensive and careful way as Chalmers does.  
2 My concern in this paper is to contrast constitutive Russellian versions of panpsychism and 
panprotopsychism (see Chalmers’ paper for these positions). I am with Chalmers in considering 
them the most promising variants of the general positions they represent (for reasons see again 
Chalmers’ paper). I will henceforth generally refer to these variants simply as ‘panpsychism’ and 
‘panprotopsychism’. 
3 I won’t try to deflect here the sense some have that the very notion of unexperienced qualities 
is incoherent. See Coleman 2015, 2013 and 2012 for efforts to make sense of unexperienced 
qualia. 
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Chalmers believes panqualityism cannot provide the required reductive 
explanation of subjectivity, because it is vulnerable to a kind of conceivability 
argument. I’ll argue (section IV) that panqualityism is not vulnerable in the way 
Chalmers suggests. First I’ll explain what’s wrong with panpsychism (section II), 
and in between (section III) I’ll offer suggestions as to how panqualityists might 
deal with some of the other combination problems Chalmers mentions, as well as 
some he omits. The overarching thesis is not just that panpsychism is effectively 
a non-starter, but that panqualityism has the resources to deal with its 
combination problems. In view of the advantages panpsychism and 
panqualityism share with respect to mainstream physicalism,4 this installs 
panqualityism as our best prospect for a theory of how to make up the mind.5 I 
start with some discussion and categorisation of the combination problems.  
 
I.  
i. The most important combination problems Chalmers exhibits include: the 
subject problem, of how a number of subjects could synchronically constitute 
another subject; the palette problem, of how a handful of basic qualities could 
                                                        
4 See Chalmers forthcoming for an account of these advantages.  
5 In another possible world, I should have liked to call panqualityism plain ‘physicalism’. But 
since our actual physicalists for some reason feel the need to deny that basic material entities 
have any qualities at all—i.e. not-merely-relational properties about which it is appropriate to 
say there is something it is like, e.g. colours—I am forced into a fruity name (Chalmers gets it from 
Feigl 1958, who credits in turn S. C. Pepper). These same actual physicalists spend much of their 
time adopting theoretical contortions of various painful sorts, in order to evade the glaring truth 
that if the ingredients that compose us (and the world) have no qualities, there is no possibility of 
our experiencing qualities. The confident counterfactual physicalists with whom I would wish to 
associate are by now busily working out a fully-fledged qualitative physics, which explains not 
only the material dynamics and development of (what we understand as) physical systems, but 
also the dynamics and development of (what we understand as) mental systems, all from a single 
set of basic principles. They can explain why pains have the causal profiles they do (and must 
have), and possess a deductive explanation of how paracetamol cures headache. Meanwhile, their 
actual counterparts are exploring hopefully the hypothesis that there are no qualities only wholly 
deceptive representations of qualities within our deluded minds. The contrast, when once stated, is 
damning.  
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generate the vast array of macroqualities; the quality problem, of how qualities 
constitute other qualities at all, the structural mismatch problem, of how the 
micromental could constitute the structure of the macromental given that the 
micromental is isomorphic with the microphysical; the unity problem, of how 
disunified instances of micromentality come together to yield the unity we find 
at the macromental level; the grain problem, of how we get a homogenous 
phenomenal field at the macro-level from discontinuous instances of 
micromentality; the boundary problem, of how micromentality is corralled into 
bounded units of consciousness.6 Some of these problems have variants applying 
specifically to panpsychism or panprotopsychism: I’ll detail these as we go.  
 
ii. We can distinguish two kinds of combination problem. A completed 
naturalistic account of mentality would mesh our best theory of minds with our 
best scientific theory, in particular with physics and neurobiology. Much of what 
we do as philosophers of mind is somewhat insulated from detailed scientific 
concerns, however. We do often employ scientific concepts as starting point, and 
we certainly hope that what we’re devising isn’t obviously inconsistent with 
accepted science. But often enough we’re busy working on things from within 
the mind side—developing theories aimed at explaining aspects of mentality, 
and which are framed largely in mental or cognitive terms.  
 
Consider as an example Rosenthal’s higher-order thought theory of 
                                                        
6  I’m using ‘micromentality’ to cover both microexperiences, as on panpsychism, and 
microqualities (which are non-phenomenal), as on panprotopsychism. In fact panprotopsychists 
often deny that microqualities are mental, on the ground that they are not conscious. I’m 
suppressing that point for ease of exposition.  
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consciousness,7 which analyses a conscious state as one that is the object of the 
right kind of occurrent thought. Naturally, Rosenthal would be dismayed if his 
theory turned out to be incompatible with our best neuroscience—were there, 
say, no feasible neurological candidate for the HOT monitoring mechanism. Yet 
it’s clear that, broadly speaking, he first formulated his theory in 
mental/cognitive terms, and (for various reasons) only down the line is there 
any chance of seeing how HOT theory meshes with the science.  
 
Meanwhile Rosenthal is bombarded with objections from philosophers. These 
are almost exclusively in mental/cognitive terms: It’s alleged that Rosenthal’s 
theory doesn’t capture the explanandum, phenomenal consciousness, because an 
unconscious thought plus an unconscious sensory state do not a conscious state 
make. Worse, it’s claimed that Rosenthal’s theory is internally inconsistent.8 
Others say it cannot cope with possible content mismatch between HOT and 
sensory state.  
 
These objections to HOT theory all take place within the arena of mind-theory, 
the immediate area wherein HOT theory aims to forge a coherent and 
illuminating position. They test its consistency, or its fit with other things we 
believe about the mind, on that same theoretical level. Quite another sort of 
objection might allege that HOT theory cannot be neurologically implemented, or 
is in some other manner incompatible with established science.9 Objections to a 
                                                        
7 See e.g. Rosenthal 2005.  
8 Block 2011 claims it offers inconsistent conditions on a conscious state. 
9 Another ‘bridging’ objection to HOT theory runs that infants lack the architecture for HOTs, 
though they are plausibly conscious.   
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theory of mind that flow from its fit with our best science I call ‘bridging 
problems’—they are difficulties around our building a bridge between a given 
theory of mentality and our scientific theories of the brain and physical world. 
The former sort of objection are ‘internal problems’—they are difficulties alleged 
to afflict a theory of mind taken on its own terms, or within the field of theories 
of mind.  
 
iii. It becomes apparent that some of Chalmers’ combination problems are 
internal problems, while some are bridging problems. The subject problem is 
internal—it concerns our concept of a subject and whether subjects could 
constitute another subject. The palette problem as Chalmers frames it is a 
bridging problem. Chalmers says the difficulty concerns a small set of qualities 
generating a ‘vast array’ of macroscopic qualities. That phrase suggests a 
problem of quantity: how do you get many (type distinct) macroqualities out of a 
few microqualities? The reason there are only a few microqualities is that 
Chalmers makes the microqualities isomorphic with microphysical properties, of 
which there are apparently only a handful. So the problem is: we want to make 
microqualities isomorphic with microphysical properties;10 that means only a 
few microqualities, so how do they generate masses of macroqualities? With the 
tie to physics removed this problem would be considerably less impressive: 
without the limited repertoire of microphysical properties we’d have no reason 
not to indulge in masses of microqualities. And if we have masses of 
microqualities, it won’t seem so problematic to derive a vast array of 
macroqualities from them, taken just in numerical terms. There are enough 
                                                        
10 This is the Russellianism in constitutive Russellian panpsychism/panprotopsychism.  
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ultimates—we could even have every macroscopic quale-type mapped to a token 
ultimate, or something like that. So Chalmers’ palette problem is a bridging 
problem. 
 
Chalmers distinguishes a further quality-related problem, which we might call 
the production problem. The difficulty is that we’ve no model for how qualities 
combine when these are separately instantiated, say by two distinct ultimates. If 
we have red and white in the same spot we can understand that as pink, 
Chalmers reckons. But if the red and the white belong to different items, how do 
we then get the pinkness? This difficulty appears closely related to another 
quality problem Chalmers doesn’t directly consider, but which I find in Lucretius. 
It has to do with whether we can understand red and white in the same place as 
pink, or at least, with how exactly we do this. Lucretius compares combining 
ultimates of different qualities to manufacturing a perfume, saying: 
 
Among the first things that you need to seek 
Is an oil that is, so far as you may find one 
Odourless and emits no breath of anything.  
For this will least with harsh taint of its own 
Corrupt the scents concocted with its substance.  
For the same reason atoms must not bring 
An odour of their own in making things11  
 
 
If you assign an ultimate a determinate quality, then as long as it continues to 
exist in the wholes it composes, which is a condition of its constituting those 
wholes, its quality must show up in—contaminate—them. So even if we can get 
past the production problem, and understand how separately instantiated 
                                                        
11 On the Nature of Things, Book II: 849-855. 
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qualities could interact to combine, we have an arguably more basic problem, of 
understanding how qualities that can combine actually do so. What does it even 
mean for two qualities to constitute a quality? Pink isn’t red, and it isn’t white 
either. One might expect that for red and white to survive in combination we 
would get as product a patch of red alongside a patch of white. Perhaps at a 
distance we might see that as pink, but it isn’t, by itself, pink. We need some 
conception of qualities interpenetrating and yielding a new product, whilst 
nonetheless (somehow) persisting, corresponding to the combining of ultimates 
and their properties that also survive in the combination.12 These latter two 
quality problems, then, concerning production and contamination, are both on 
the internal side—pertaining to the mechanics and dynamics of qualities taken 
by themselves, nothing really to do with science.  
 
There may be one further quality problem, which seems to exacerbate the 
contamination problem. This concerns qualitative incommensurability. If 
ultimates have fixed qualities, just what set of microqualities is it that can be re-
arranged now as the smell of roses, now as an orgasm, now as a percept of the 
blue sky? These macroqualities seem so qualitatively different, it’s hard to 
imagine generating them from some stable basic palette.13 This problem is most 
                                                        
12 To be clear, if, as in fusion, the ingredients—things, properties—do not survive production of 
the novel entity, then this is causal emergence, not constitution. See Chalmers’ discussion (this 
volume) of Seager’s ‘combinatorial infusion’ as an option for panpsychists.  
13 Lockwood and Foster have recently been concerned with this problem. Lockwood: ‘What, one 
may ask, is the use of attributing, say, embryonic colour to the ultimate physical components 
involved in the neuronal goings-on that are supposed to be constitutive of a phenomenal patch of 
red, if these self-same constituents are also to be capable of figuring in auditory or olfactory 
experiences which are wholly devoid of visual phenomenology?’ (1993: 277) Foster: ‘How…could 
a different arrangement of pain-particles yield a visual experience or a surge of anger?’ 
(1991:127) And: ‘if we are dealing with a visual experience, then presumably we have to assign 
visual qualities to the constituents of the neural item in order to account for its introspectible 
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vivid when we limit the micropalette to a few qualities in order to fit with 
physics. But it isn’t essentially a bridging problem; it would be problematic even 
if we decoupled from Russellianism and went in for masses of microqualities.14  
  
The contamination problem would be a challenge even if we didn’t face 
apparently incommensurable macroqualities—qualities that seemingly couldn’t 
come from the same ingredients merely rearranged. White and red don’t seem 
worlds apart qualitatively, in the way that both do when contrasted with the 
smell of roses, and in the way these three qualia do, in turn, when compared with 
the feeling of a pinch on the forearm. Yet still we have work to do to grasp how 
red and white exist in—contaminate—their pink product. The 
incommensurability problem can be seen as making the contamination problem 
all the harder, or as an especially tricky aspect of it.15  
 
What we require overall, when it comes to our micropalette, is a story which 
explains the coming together of separately instanced qualities, explicates the 
very notion of qualities constituting other qualities, and defuses the sense that 
certain macroqualities are so qualitatively different from one another that they 
couldn’t derive from a stable set of basic ingredients. If we can do these things 
                                                                                                                                                              
character. But these qualities would not be appropriate to the roles of similar physical 
constituents in neural items correlated with non-visual experiences’ (Ibid.: 129). 
14 These would still have to show up in their products, and some would surely seem qualitatively 
too far away for this to be possible.  
15 It’s pretty clearly unacceptable to assign fixed qualities to ultimates in isolation, and then say 
that in combination they simply lose these (this would be to imagine that a red and a white 
ultimate each independently ‘turn’ pink upon meeting). For, as Lucretius says: ‘…if they were to 
give up from their bodies, Their own power of feeling, and acquire another one, What was the 
point of giving them in the first place, What is taken away?’ (On the Nature of Things, Book II: 
924-7). Generally speaking, fundamental intrinsic properties must 1). remain in play in 
constitution and 2). be directly explanatorily relevant to their products. This point later forms the 
core of my objection to panpsychism.  
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we will presumably also answer Chalmers’ question about how the vast array of 
macroqualities is produced.16  
 
iv. Structural mismatch is a bridging problem. If microexperiential structure 
matches microphysical structure, then it seems macroexperiential structure is 
restricted to isomorphism with macrophysical structure: yet macrophysical and 
macroexperiential structures differ, Chalmers suggests. Were it not for the 
matching of microexperiential structure to microphysical structure, we’d 
presumably be free to envisage microexperiential structure as more obviously 
appropriate to yielding macroexperiential structure, so this problem concerns 
meshing our account of the mind with science.17 Chalmers’ grain problem is 
something like an internal analogue of the structural mismatch problem. It has 
little to do with science, stemming only from the thought that microexperiential 
instances are discontinuous, while macroexperience, supposedly constituted by 
them, is continuous.18  
 
v. Finally, the unity problem, and nearby boundary problem, are internal. The 
question is: if you have a phenomenally unified and bounded experiential field, 
                                                        
16 Recognition of something like these problems is probably behind Feigl’s suggestion (1971: 
308) that on panqualityism the fundamental qualities had better be relatively ‘colorless’. But 
then: 1) We’d face a problem around their having enough qualitative ‘oomph’ to generate 
macroqualities at all. 2) Making the basic qualities homogenous (‘colorless’) doesn’t apparently 
help with the problem of how we get, via their combination, to such remote and distinctive 
locations in quality space as we actually find.  
17 Chalmers says ‘given a Russellian view, it is not at all easy to see how these [micro] structures 
could be [allowed to be] so different that they yield the vast differences between macrophysical 
and macrophenomenal structure’, p. 28, my emphasis 
18 Sellars’ original grain problem is more plausibly about bridging: neurons are discontinuous, he 
says, while the experiential field is continuous, yet the latter is supposedly constituted by the 
former. See e.g. his 1963: 35.  
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how is that constituted by discrete instances of micromentality? Since for 
panpsychists microqualities are had by microsubjects, this difficulty is for them 
entwined with the subject problem: how are separate microsubjects to constitute 
a macrosubject with its own, single, experiential field?  
 
vi. There’s a case for considering internal problems as more pressing than 
bridging problems. It seems that if we’re unable to put a coherent theory of mind 
on the table in the first place, taken on its own terms, then we needn’t venture to 
check how it matches with the science. The theory is already hopeless. Of course 
lack of mesh with science is also serious. But since there is usually more than a 
single option for understanding the science of the moment, and the dominant 
scientific account in an area at a time is highly liable to shift, this makes lack of 
bridging arguably less urgent than an internal clash for a theory of mind; at least, 
as regards widely-accepted and stable posits of mind-theory, like phenomenal 
consciousness, or the existence and nature of macrosubjects, our prime 
concerns. Given lack of bridging, one could at least hope for a change on the 
scientific side to remove the obstacle. In any case, even if a mind theory fatally 
fails to bridge, running against some scientific bedrock, it seems that to get that 
far along the proving process it had already to be in decent shape internally. 
Thus internal problems have a certain theoretical priority. The really big 
immediate questions for panpsychism and panqualityism, accordingly, concern 
their most serious respective internal problems: for panpsychism, whether it can 
deal with the subject combination problem; for panqualityism, whether it can 
generate subjects from non-subjects. These topics form the backbone of our 
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discussion. 
 
II. 
i. Examination of its distinctive internal problem, the subject combination 
problem, will lead us to seriously question the basic theoretical motivation for 
panpsychism.19 
 
ii. James is widely cited on the subject problem,20 but Lucretius had his eye on 
this one too. Were ultimates subjects of experience, he argues: 
 
…their unions and combinations, 
Would make nothing more than a crowd of living things 
Any more than men and cattle and wild beasts 
By combination could make anything.21 
 
Taking James and Lucretius together, we can discern a positive and a negative 
subject problem for panpsychism, which correspond, roughly and respectively, 
to Chalmers’ unity problem for panpsychism and what he calls the subjects-
summing problem. The negative problem, subjects-summing, is effectively an 
explanatory gap: no amount of talk of subjects coming together seems to entail 
anything about any further subject. So it doesn’t appear that panpsychism can 
account for the constitution of a macro-subject, which was certainly the aim of 
constitutive Russellian panpsychism.22 The positive difficulty is something like a 
genuine metaphysical stumbling-block or apparent impossibility: How could you 
                                                        
19 Our focus is constitutive Russellian versions of panpsychism and panprotopsychism, recall.  
20 The very famous passage being the one occurring at p.160 of his 1890. See Strawson 2006, and 
accompanying papers, for more recent discussion of the subject problem. 
21 Ibid.: Book II, 920-23. 
22 For the definitive version of this argument see Goff 2009. 
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hope to produce a phenomenally unified, single-perspective, subject by 
assembling a group of subjects each of which essentially has its own perspective? 
It really doesn’t seem that you could, in a constitutive manner. Constitution 
requires the relationship between parts and whole to be synchronous, and 
means that all there is to the constituted phenomenon are the entities said to 
constitute it, their properties, and their relations. That entails, for panpsychism, 
that at a time the existence of a single macro-level perspective—a conscious 
point of view like one of ours—is nothing but the existence of a group of 
(micro)subjects, each with its own perspective. But a group of subjects looks like 
a crowd, and a crowd is not a unified conscious mind. I’ve developed the positive 
problem elsewhere,23 but as the explanatory gap problem for panpsychism is 
more widely known, and suffices for our purposes, I’ll concentrate on it here. 
 
As currently elaborated, the subjects-summing problem gets embedded in the 
following argument: 
 
(1) If panpsychism is true, the existence of a number of microsubjects with certain 
experiences necessitates the existence of a distinct macrosubject. 
 
(2) It is never the case that the existence of a number of subjects with certain 
experiences necessitates the existence of a distinct subject. 
 
 
(3) Panpsychism is false.24 
 
                                                        
23 See Coleman 2013.  
24 Taken from Chalmers, this volume, p.XX, who credits Goff 2009. Note that in Chalmers’ 
formulation ‘panpsychism’ reads ‘constitutive panpsychism’; this is unnecessary for us given the 
earlier decision to focus on constitutive Russellian positions.  
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The support for premise two (the subjects-summing problem) is the alleged fact 
that: 
 
(*) For any group of subjects (with certain experiences), it is conceivable that those 
subjects exist (with their experiences) and no other subjects exist. 
 
I find this argument fairly powerful. But I don’t think it quite gets to the bottom 
of the deep problem panpsychism faces in this vicinity. This deep problem flows 
from the following principle:  
 
(**) Fundamental intrinsic properties help to explain their macroscopic instances. 
 
This principle is metaphysical on its face, but it also has a methodological aspect. 
Fundamental posits, especially of intrinsic properties, must earn their 
explanatory keep. Specifically, we posit a fundamental property for the purpose 
of accounting for its higher-level instances.25 Mass, charge and extension all do 
this job, indeed it explains their being attributed at the basic level at all. We don’t 
make otiose fundamental posits, so any posit that doesn’t earn its explanatory 
keep should be discarded. More properly, it should not have been entertained in 
the first place. This is the situation we face regarding the panpsychist’s posit that 
ultimates possess the intrinsic property of subjectivity.  
 
iii. The reason the subjects-summing argument doesn’t quite touch the depths of 
this problem has partly to do with the fact that it talks not in terms of 
                                                        
25 This isn’t to say there aren’t other explanatory roles played by fundamental posits—but such 
properties must at least explain their higher-level instances, where they have such. 
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explanation, but of necessitation. This permits the panpsychist a certain kind of 
sidestep. If no mere assembly of subjects necessitates a further subject, but, as 
prospective panpsychists, or theorists rightly bent on giving the model a fair 
chance, we aspire to such necessitation, a natural suggestion arises, in the form 
of Goff’s phenomenal bonding, tentatively endorsed by Chalmers. 
 
Goff’s idea, I believe, is that we’ve perhaps focused too exclusively on 
microsubjects and their properties, without thinking imaginatively enough about 
what relations among them might accomplish.26 Perhaps the addition of some 
special relation to a set of subjects might supply the necessitation of a 
macrosubject. So Goff’s proposal is that a macrosubject forms when a set of 
microsubjects is said to ‘phenomenally bond’: a subjective analogue, it seems, for 
the bonding among atoms which forms molecules. 
 
But, we may reasonably inquire, concerning a set of subjects from whom a 
macrosubject is thus produced, what exactly is their phenomenally bonding, just 
what does it amount to? As far as I see, each microsubject contributes some 
experiential contents that then get enjoyed by the macrosubject. This much 
makes sense: it’s not obviously incoherent that a third person could have 
experiences now, constituted of some of what you and I are experiencing; why 
shouldn’t we contribute experiential contents to this individual? Maybe we can 
even keep on experiencing our separate contents meanwhile.  This all seems (at 
least) intelligible under the heading ‘telepathy’.  
 
                                                        
26 See Goff’s paper, this volume.  
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The difficulty for phenomenal bonding comes not on the experiential content 
side, but on the subject side. We need not only to provide the new macrosubject 
with contents to experience, we are required to manufacture this macrosubject 
in the first place: the point of view for whom the contents are to be like 
something. And there’s nothing in the sheer idea of phenomenal bonding that 
tells us how discrete subjects produce a new subject. What ‘groups’ those 
subjects’ experiences together in a new phenomenally unified perspective, a new 
bounded field? Certainly nothing about having microsubjects already in play 
explains this. Each of the experiential packets—the contents—to be proffered to 
the novel subject belongs already to a point of view, and we are imagining those 
to remain intact on this constitutive model. Perhaps each content packet 
extended to the new subject carries with it (somehow) a ‘quantum’ of the 
subjectivity of its previous owner.27 But then, clearly, we would simply end up 
with multiple perspectives bunched together in the new spot (the construction 
site of the prospective macrosubject), one for each packet of experiential content 
proffered by a micro-subject: for, surely, any ‘quantum’ of subjectivity implies a 
subject, so implies a perspective. We would then need, anew, to explain how 
these several perspectives (‘subjective quanta’) added up to a single unified one. 
The subject problem thereby respawns, which is the first sign of a nasty regress: 
nasty because we’ve made no explanatory progress.  
 
iv. Chalmers attempts to put flesh on Goff’s idea: 
 
A natural candidate here [for the phenomenal bonding 
                                                        
27 This sort of thing has been suggested to me by Pat Lewtas.  
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relation] is the co-consciousness relation: a relation such 
that whenever it relates two phenomenal states, they are 
experienced jointly. When this relation holds among the 
states of distinct microsubjects, those states will be 
experienced jointly by a new subject.28 
 
But this is to describe the (desired) outcome of a certain process, without telling 
us at all how it is meant to be achieved. Co-consciousness requires a subject: it’s 
consciousness for a subject of some items. That makes being co-conscious 
relevantly like being co-punched, in that when two things are co-punched, we 
must ask: by whom? When we drag two experiential packets out of respective 
microsubjects, whence does the new subject come for whom they are to be co-
conscious? To say that experiential packets are related now by co-consciousness 
is certainly to imply that a new subject has come into being for whom they are 
phenomenally unified, but it is not to tell us how this happens, nor whether it is 
possible—the things we wanted to know. In the absence of further positive 
content, what this notion of phenomenal bonding really amounts to is a schema: 
it specifies what an explanation of subject combination must achieve, without 
providing any of that explanation. It is a mere black box.  
 
v. What if we try just to take phenomenal bonding at face value? We can readily 
enough imagine that when a number of microsubjects get into the requisite 
relationship—whatever it is—a macrosubject pops out of thin air. Thus 
phenomenal bonding, somewhat by stipulation, might supply the necessitation of 
a macrosubject: what was at issue in the subjects-summing argument. With 
phenomenal bonding added to the account, and so to the background of one’s 
                                                        
28 Chalmers, this volume, p.XX. 
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conceiving, one might then no longer be able to conceive of a set of subjects 
getting into the prescribed relationship without a macrosubject forming. But the 
glaring truth about this ‘explanation’ is that the fact of the phenomenally-bonded 
ingredients’ being subjects plays no role whatever. All the work is done by the 
phenomenal bonding relation: it is a relation such that, by definition, it generates 
a macrosubject. It seems that we could as well imagine panqualityist-style 
subjectless qualitative patches as our ingredients, and posit a bonding relation 
such that they not only pooled sensory contents, but generated a subject to 
experience these. We could then talk, with Chalmers, of ‘a relation such that 
whenever it relates two [panqualityist] states, they are experienced jointly…by a 
new subject.' It sounds just the same: there is as much—as little—explanation of 
the constitution of the novel subject on both accounts.  
 
So even if phenomenal bonding could fill the lacuna around necessitation that 
looms large in the subjects-summing argument, it does nothing as yet to tell us 
what the explanatory role of the panpsychist’s microsubjects is. Thus far, the 
intended role of subjects in the constitution of a subject is entirely opaque.  That 
is the really deep problem for panpsychism: What is the principled motivation 
for positing microsubjects in the first place, just what explanatory work do they 
do? The fact that we are tempted to appeal to phenomenal bonding shows that 
panpsychists lack an answer to this question.  
 
vi. What then would a good panpsychist explanation of ‘phenomenal bonding’ 
look like? It’s informative to consider the case of atoms bonding into molecules. 
Relations do a lot of work there; for instance with the oxygen’s sharing of the 
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hydrogens’ electrons in the formation of water. But the important point about 
such relations is that they visibly flow from the intrinsic natures of the relata. 
This is generally the case with relations, in fact.29 It is because of the relative 
looseness of hydrogen electrons, coupled with the convenient gap in the 
oxygen’s outer shell, that electron sharing happens so readily in the constitution 
of water. For phenomenal bonding to work, we would need some analogue of 
this sort of explanation. It would be taking into consideration the intrinsic 
features of microsubjects that suggested to us the mechanism for their 
phenomenally bonding—a subjective equivalent of electron-sharing. The case 
with subjects is in reality exactly the reverse: it is because panpsychists cannot 
see how subjects could come together, given their intrinsic properties, that the 
supplement of phenomenal bonding is broached. We have here a relation 
devised precisely to remedy the obvious defects of its putative relata. This is bad 
news for panpsychism: it strongly suggests that microsubjectivity is (at best) 
explanatorily irrelevant to the constitution of macrosubjects, which in turn rules 
it out as a fundamental posit, according to (**).  
 
vii. My diagnosis of panpsychism is as follows. It becomes tempting thanks to the 
admitted starting power of the intuition that from ingredients lacking entirely in 
subjectivity, we could not a subject produce. However, panpsychists are guilty of 
sliding from this thought, to the doctrine that if we just add subjectivity to our 
microingredients, all will be well. Yet this transition is clearly unjustified, as it 
stands. For it may be that, even were the starting thought correct, it would not 
help to add subjectivity to our base. That is in effect what is demonstrated by the 
                                                        
29 Jill is taller than Bob thanks to their intrinsic properties; and so on.  
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dialectic above, and the resort to phenomenal bonding: the posit of fundamental 
subjectivity as an intrinsic property of ultimates has yielded no progress in our 
attempt to account for macrosubjects.  
 
The panpsychist’s starting intuition, concerning the impossibility of deriving 
subjectivity from the non-subjective, runs up against another intuitive principle, 
which seems at least as powerful: that subjectivity, far from being a diffused sort 
of ‘stuff’ or generalised property, inevitably comes in the form of certain quanta, 
namely subjects themselves. The self-contained nature of these quanta, their 
phenomenal unity and boundedness, makes them singularly unsuited to the 
constitution of any further entity.30 So while panpsychists suffer the intuition 
that subjectivity must be there in the microbasics, the form in which it 
unavoidably occurs, packaged as subjects, at once blocks the hoped-for 
explanatory payoff. Panpsychism is thus crushed between two irreconcilable 
intuitions.  
 
It seems these two intuitions cannot both be correct. Yet while it may be hard to 
envisage a subject forming from non-subjects, the idea that subjectivity could 
exist somehow in general, as a blanket quantity—apt to being broken down and 
reformed, like dough—seems more obviously incoherent. At most we picture a 
universe-subject when we think along these lines; but such an entity still has 
undeniably a point of view, and, as a corollary, creates a difficulty for the 
manufacture of subjects of our level. As long as the metaphysical solidity of 
                                                        
30 In respect of their subjectivity, at least. People arguably form into larger entities such as 
crowds, senates and nations. But, as James notes (just after his famous passage about combining 
feelings) these alleged entities do not have a ‘group mind’ in any serious sense.  
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subjects is acknowledged—a driving factor behind panpsychism, of course—
panpsychism cannot, it seems, succeed. Panpsychists would have to embrace 
emergentism, owning that, with the assembly and phenomenal bonding of 
microsubjects, ‘it just happens’ that a macrosubject forms. Of theorists who take 
this route, we may even more properly ask why they require the posit of 
fundamental subjectivity.   
 
viii. Since microsubjectivity is at best an idle wheel in the explanation of 
macrosubjects, even on the most promising panpsychist account, it is not a posit 
we should go in for. This means a rejection of panpsychism. We should retain 
qualities in micro-ontology, but deny that they require subjects to experience 
them. Panqualityism has thus a more pared-down ontology, and the question is 
whether it is adequate to the phenomena. This theory faces still the other 
combination problems, as well as a new set of its own: it must generate subjects 
and awareness from ingredients lacking both properties. This appears, prima 
facie, a pair of new internal problems at least as formidable as the subject 
problem was for panpsychism.  
 
III 
i. Light of the subject problem, we’ve the following combination problems still in 
play: the palette problem; the structural mismatch problem; the unity problem; the 
boundary problem; the grain problem; the production problem; the contamination 
problem; the incommensurability problem. Additionally, we have a new awareness 
problem, which panqualityism faces due to stipulating that microquality 
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instances are not conscious.31  
 
Isn’t there also a new subject-related problem, of how subjects are constructed 
from non-subjects, for panqualityism?32 I don’t think so, actually. For our 
purposes we may take a subject minimally to be an aware entity—anything that 
has conscious awareness.  It follows that showing how there can be subjects, in 
the minimal sense, reduces to the problem of accounting for awareness. 
 
The unity problem now splits in two: the qualitative unity problem is the same as, 
or will be solved in the same way as, the production problem. If we understood 
how quality instances tokened by distinct particulars could form into a combined 
single quality instantiation, it seems we would have given an account of how 
qualitative unities form. The unity problem for panpsychism concerned unity 
when there are multiple ultimate-subjects in play, with discrete unified fields of 
experience. We no longer have those subjects in play, only instances of quality 
belonging to different ultimates. There is a story to tell about how qualities 
separately instanced combine together into ‘larger’ and ‘unified’ qualities, but 
put this way the difficulty seems equivalent to the production problem. So 
qualitative unity and production problems appear close enough to be counted as 
one. 
 
                                                        
31 With panpsychism and its microsubjects now out of the way, it’s worth recording, as regards 
the broader argumentative context, that regular physicalism faces all these combination 
problems (the question of how qualities combine must be faced sooner or later, at micro- or 
macro-levels) plus the problem (surely insurmountable—see Coleman 2015) of manufacturing 
qualities out of the non-qualitative. It follows that even if we can make no decent progress here 
with panqualityism’s problems, it is in at least as good shape as regular physicalism; really much 
better shape, once one takes in the irreducibility of qualities. 
32 Cf. Chalmers, this volume p. 6. 
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The sense of ‘unity’ operative in the unity problem for panpsychism is 
phenomenal unity, the unity of the experiential contents given to a single subject. 
All the elements I experience can be grouped together phenomenally in what we 
can call my ‘overall experience’. They are also separated phenomenally from the 
elements you experience. The challenge of accounting for these features hasn’t 
gone away. When we come to the panqualityist mechanism for awareness, we’ll 
see that it can naturally be used to account for the phenomenal unity and 
boundedness of macrosubjective experience.  
 
ii. The production/qualitative unity problem: How do separately instantiated 
qualities (e.g. the redness and whiteness of distinct particulars) yield a combined 
quality? If there is a genuine problem here, then we perhaps need to reject the 
premise that the qualities are separately instantiated, or remain separately 
instantiated. Chalmers sees no problem with co-instantiated qualities combining. 
So if separate instantiations can become non-separate in the combination of the 
qualities, we may have a solution. Chalmers discusses a ‘quantum holist’ picture 
where two or more ultimates can get entangled, gaining properties that then 
entitle us to treat them more or less as one item. Now suppose that two ultimates 
presently unentangled instantiate red and white, respectively. Then it might be 
reasonable to consider them, once entangled, as instantiating pink: the ultimates 
entangle, and so do their qualities. You can no longer take a red and a white 
‘reading’ separately, as it were; rather the two qualities now have to be treated 
as a block. Some even interpret entanglement as the two (or more) entangled 
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things literally becoming one thing.33 If that’s plausible, then the formerly 
separately instantiated qualities—redness and whiteness—are now co-
instantiated, and the puzzle appears solved.34  
 
Chalmers raises two major concerns about quantum holism, for panpsychists.35 
First, entanglement might be taken to unite the whole universe—especially since 
it likely emerged from a singularity.36 This, in the context of panpsychism, would 
lead to a single universe-sized subject, and the decomposition problem: how do 
you get from that universe-subject down to us?37 Second, Chalmers writes that 
‘The structure of the quantum state of brain-level systems is quite different from 
the structure of our experience.’38 This seems to be a bridging problem, a 
quantum structural mismatch problem. I have specific things to say about 
structural mismatch later. But for now we can observe that these two problems 
are significantly diminished without panpsychism. Panqualityism plus quantum 
                                                        
33 This provides a neat means of removing apparent action at a distance (not to mention 
apparently instantaneous—so faster than light—effects!) when entangled particles are very far 
away one from one another.  
34 Chalmers seems to see separate instantiation as a bar to combination. We may remove this via 
entanglement, without going so far as to say that entanglement is all it takes for such 
combination. We may want to keep entanglement (or co-location) as a necessary but not 
sufficient condition, so as to avoid anything that is entangled instantiating only a single quality—
for instance the entire universe, if this is wholly entangled with itself.  
35 Chalmers sees the possible utility of quantum holism for panpsychists like this: ‘If subjects’ 
experiential fields could be identified with physical quantum wholes—large physical fundamental 
states—this might remove the need to account for them combinatorially.’ (XX). Though not a 
combinatorial panpsychism, Chalmers still counts this a constitutive Russellian variety (p. 15). 
36 All portions of matter would then have all been entangled from the start, plausibly remaining 
so no matter how far apart everything subsequently drifted. 
37 This challenge aside, I think William James revealed cosmo-panpsychism as incoherent. 
Assuming our reality as subjects, we are on this view phenomenal components of the universe-
subject. It follows that the universe-subject is conscious of all the things you and I are conscious 
of. Yet I can, for example, sincerely wonder what you’re thinking. The universe-subject cannot 
sincerely wonder what you’re thinking, though, since it already knows (by feeling) what you’re 
thinking. So it seems my sincere feeling of wonderment cannot, after all, be a phenomenal 
component of the universe-subject, as against the initial supposition.  I believe this clever 
argument is in A Pluralistic Universe somewhere, though I can no longer locate it.  
38 This volume, p. 18. 
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holism won’t imply a universe subject, because ultimates aren’t subjects, on this 
view, so their entanglement doesn’t imply ever-bigger subjects. What 
entanglement might imply instead, under panqualityism, is a universe-wide 
entangled web of qualities. The universe could be conceived of as an enormous 
enqualitied fabric, with each quality instance being deeply related and entwined 
with all the others.39 The quality of a given co-ordinate in that web to some 
extent supervenes on what qualities are present at all the other co-ordinates, so 
yielding a massively holistic qualitative universe.  
 
We can achieve this result thanks to a difference in how the panqualityist is 
employing entanglement here, as compared with the quantum holist 
panpsychist. That panpsychist utilises entanglement as the mechanism of subject 
combination. All we are doing is using it to overcome the obstacle of separate 
instantiation that Chalmers sees as blocking quality combination. When qualities 
are to combine their bearers plausibly have to be entangled, we may say. But we 
can frame this as a necessary but not sufficient condition of qualitative 
combination. This means that not every entanglement entails the production of a 
single unified quality. So if the whole universe is entangled, we needn’t say that it 
instantiates but a single quality. Of course, we will need at some point to 
speculate as to the physical mechanism that, together with co-location, effects 
combination. But note that we have now moved from an internal problem—how 
could separately instantiated qualities combine? (answer: they are not 
separately instantiated, in the relevant sense)—to a bridging problem: what is 
                                                        
39 Lee Smolin has suggested that the varying qualities we experience correspond to energy 
fluctuations: in a panqualityist context, this suggestion can naturally be expanded to take in the 
whole universe, with the fluctuations construed as its aspects.  
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the physical analogue of quality combination? Since bridging problems are less 
urgent than internal ones, this represents a modicum of progress.   
 
Because panqualityism, unlike this quantum holist panpsychism, doesn’t 
envisage the structuring or entanglement of ultimates to constitute the 
structuring of consciousnesses into larger conscious wholes, the scope and 
structure of our experiential fields is an issue that floats to some degree free of 
questions about the more basic structure of the physical universe. The 
panqualityist has one job explaining how microqualities combine, and a separate 
task to account for consciousness of qualities, plus the unity and boundaries of 
macroconsciousness. This unburdens the panqualityist of the universe-subject 
worry. But it also means there’s no problem that the quantum structure of a 
brain doesn’t match the structure of experience. By hypothesis, something extra 
is needed for experiences—a.k.a. awareness of the qualities—and the 
panqualityist could aim to manufacture an awareness relation that operates on 
entangled groups of ultimates at the macro-level, and at the same time structures 
and defines the experiential field. This would amount to a panqualityist 
macroscopic ‘cutter’ of the brain-level or universe-level entangled quality-web, 
slicing in just the right places to yield fields of qualities corresponding in scope 
with those of our conscious acquaintance. 
 
iii. Before investigating that cutter, I want to address the contamination problem. 
We can make sense of red and white sensory qualities adding up to pink, I 
suggest, in just the sort of intuitive way that we understand that if we mix a red 
and a white dab of paint we’ll get a pink dab of paint in that spot. We’re in the 
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business of building a constitutive model of macroexperience, so we want to be 
able to say, of the pink quality, that its pinkness at a time is nothing but the 
redness and the whiteness, and their relationship, which requires in turn that 
these qualities survive in the whole. Clearly they don’t survive as they were 
before, in separated form. Now that their particulars are entangled, the qualities 
are in a sense co-located. We can think of the qualities as surviving in their 
contributions to the pinkness, as in a sense the spin (etc.) of entangled particles 
survives from pre-entanglement as an aspect of the novel state.40 Analogously, 
distinct physical forces are present in complex real-life situations as the 
contribution each makes to the result. Intuitively, if you were able to remove the 
red quality from the blend, you would no longer have pinkness, and likewise for 
the white: so they are still present. Have the red and white survived with their 
qualitative identities intact? Yes: that’s the only explanation of the ongoing fact 
that we have this pink. It takes precisely this red and this white to make this pink. 
But still, you can’t find red on its own—or white for that matter—given their 
conjoint state.  
 
If this is cogent, then we have an intuitive model for the constitution of qualities 
by other qualities,41 and a picture of how qualities ‘contaminate’ their wholes. 
They are still present, even though—in our example—as elements of a newly-
formed pinkness, red and white are now in a sense more dependent on the 
                                                        
40 This apparently clashes with Chalmers’ reading of entanglement, or at least, the one he offers 
the quantum holist panpsychist, whereby the new state wholly supersedes the unentangled 
elements. I’m more inclined to construe the latter as helping to constitute the new entity. A 
physicist friend tells me that (e.g.) entangled electrons survive in the new state somewhat ‘like 
sausages and potatoes in toad-in-the-hole’. This makes sense, though I didn’t know that toad-in-
the-hole had potatoes. Thanks to Paul Cook for discussion.  
41 Which neatly parallels—even helps us perhaps to visualise—corresponding microphysical 
operations.  
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entangled whole. Notably, then, while we couldn’t intelligibly make subjects 
constitute other subjects, we can intelligibly make qualities constitute other 
qualities. This represents panqualityism’s essential advance over panpsychism.  
 
iv. This line of thought raises the palette problem—how can we derive the 
masses of macroqualities just by blending a few micro-qualities (even if we 
understand the blending)? For a start we can note that this bridging problem 
takes a certain non-compulsory view of the scientific picture. It’s true that if we 
concentrate on conventional microphysical quantities like mass, charge and spin, 
there don’t look to be many slots available for qualities. Even if we ruled that it’s 
particle types which each possess a distinctive kind of quality, that won’t get us 
terribly many determinates. Given that we’re likely to discover more particles, 
we can expect that number to increase somewhat. Another move is to consider 
matters in terms of string theory.42 Strings can potentially vibrate in infinitely 
many ways, and perhaps each vibration corresponds to a different quality.43 
There’d be room then to include olfactory qualities, colours, etc. all as having 
basic instantiations. There would still be much to do to work out how they 
combined, but the numerical challenge of Chalmers’ palette problem wouldn’t 
seem so pressing.44 Anyway it’s not clear how pressing that challenge is, even 
                                                        
42 Or something like Bohm’s idea (1980) of a much finer-grained fundament of entities and 
properties beneath the quantum mechanical level currently considered basic.  
43 Again Smolin’s suggestion about quality correlating with energy fluctuations comes to mind.  
44 On string theory Lockwood says: ‘it seems incomprehensible that different combinations of 
collective or individual string states could generate the qualitative diversity that is manifest at 
the phenomenal level. It seems inconceivable in much the same way, and for much the same 
reasons, that it is inconceivable that an artist, however skilled, should conjure the simulacrum of 
a Turner sunset from a palette containing only black and white paints.’ (1993: 276)  This remark 
is puzzling from the standpoint of a mere worry about the number of slots available in the 
microphysical realm for qualities, given the range in which strings can vibrate. This suggests that 
the real worry as regards the micro-palette and ‘diversity’ concerns incommensurability. See 
below. 
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within the constraints of a few basic qualities. Given a few basic elements, these 
can clearly be combined in an enormous variety of ways: for any combination of 
one instance of each of the basic set, we can add a further instance of one of the 
basic members, presumably altering thereby the quality of the whole. In that way 
we can see there are potentially limitless places to go merely numerically.  
 
v. This suggests that Chalmers’ palette problem is in the end best understood as 
the incommensurability problem. Just what restricted set of microqualities is it 
that in recombination can yield now a pure blueness, now the smell of roses? We 
have perhaps gained some sense of how qualities can contaminate their 
products, but they must still contaminate them as such, as the qualities they are. 
The problem is that some macro-qualia are apparently so unlike some other 
macro-qualia that we can’t imagine them having ingredients in common. This is 
the relevant sense of ‘diversity’: qualitative diversity.  
 
I think the answer will require radical reconceptualisation of our quality-space: 
discarding the idea of discrete modalities, and coming to think of phenomenal 
qualities, of all kinds, as on a continuum, in the way we think of the colours. So 
just as it’s possible to move across the colour spectrum in tiny, almost 
undetectable steps, it must be possible to move from tastes to sounds, sounds to 
colours, and so on, via equally tiny steps. Tiptoeing between modalities already 
seems conceivable in certain cases, perhaps even actual. We know that what we 
experience as ‘taste’ is really some kind of fusion of qualia sourced from the nose 
and from the tongue (to separate these just eat something while pinching your 
nostrils). Perhaps we don’t routinely notice this because of the qualitative 
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overlap between olfactory and gustatory qualia. Again, sometimes a thump, 
especially experienced while falling asleep, is not clearly distinguishable as felt 
or as heard (it doesn’t appear to be both)—overlap between tactile and auditory 
qualia seems intelligible. One thinks also, in this connection, of the experience of 
deep bass drumming. It even strikes me as plausible that tactile qualia are just 
(qualitatively) more ‘forceful’ or ‘solid’ counterparts of ‘thinner’ auditory qualia.  
 
To address qualitative incommensurability we must stretch to conceiving of such 
continuities as the rule rather than the exception. Hartshorne ably defends this 
‘continuum hypothesis’, and for want of space I refer the reader to his 
discussion.45 Let me only mention here his helpful idea that, where two sets of 
our qualia stubbornly appear absolutely different (as perhaps with taste and 
colour qualia), this may be an artefact of a missing ‘intermediary’ modality that 
we lack (perhaps it is not evolutionarily useful for us to have it). So imagine that 
the qualia of the shark’s electric sense are the missing modality in question: it 
would then be possible to stone-step from visual qualia to shark electric qualia 
through to taste qualia.46 
 
To further motivate the continuum hypothesis I offer the following small, 
hopefully suggestive, thought-experiment: Imagine a creature whose qualia-
space featured only (what we would call) colours. Though possessing our five 
                                                        
45 See Hartshorne 1934, especially the first half. Of particular note are i. his argument that it’s 
possible for an auditory quale to be qualitatively closer to a visual quale than to another auditory 
quale (he compares a fife note to silver and to a dull thump) and ii. his clever discussion of 
synaesthesia as evidencing the continuum hypothesis.  
46 Objection: If colours are like electric qualia, but colour qualia are unlike taste qualia, then 
electric qualia cannot be like taste qualia. Yet we know that transitivity of similarity fails even 
among the colours.   
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external senses, their qualitative products in its consciousness would just be 
colours of different sorts, with no colour that features in ‘audition’ featuring also 
in ‘vision’, and so on. We can get some grip on this being’s mental life by thinking 
about the way that heat—thought of primarily as a tactile quality—can feature in 
visual experience as red or orange. Now we just have to imagine that the 
creature, in touching a warm surface, experiences these visual qualia only, 
instead of the tactile ones we feel.  
 
Plausibly this creature would come to conceive of the qualia corresponding to its 
various senses, what for us would just be different kinds of colours, as qualia 
belonging to irreducibly different ‘modal spaces’. This would seem the likely 
result just as long as no particular colour featured in more than one modality. We 
can imagine that the creature’s tactile sensations are all varying shades of blue, 
vision presents only reds, smell the greens, and so on, with the places where 
these qualities (for us) overlap conveniently screened out by the organism’s 
evolution, to prevent confusion (just as we might hypothesise that we helpfully 
screen out certain overlaps between the qualia of our various ‘modalities’). The 
distal stimuli, as well as the different transceivers by which we absorb signals 
from them, are all too apt to contaminate our conception of the qualia they elicit, 
generating misleading impressions of absolute difference. Perhaps a being with a 
qualia-space correspondingly greater than ours as ours is greater than the 
colour-only creature, would conceive of human qualia as belonging to a single 
‘modality’.   
 
If the continuum hypothesis is correct, then there isn’t any genuine 
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incommensurability between different kinds of qualities—differences are always 
of degree rather than of kind. We might well think there are incommensurables, 
because we lack some areas of quality-space that would join up the qualities in 
question. It is not inconceivable, then, that just as (I believe) we could entertain 
the idea of a basic set of colours that in recombination could get you to all 
corners of the colour spectrum, there might be an ‘intermodal’47 quality set that 
could take you to all corners of qualia-space as we know it, and beyond. We will 
then understand qualitative identity and difference in terms of the numerical 
identity or difference of these underlying components. The qualities required to 
do this job are likely not directly conceivable for us, being as they must lie ‘in 
between’ all the qualia we know of (they are present in our qualia only as so 
many myriad trace contributions). But I have some hopes of a genius who will 
figure out how we may qualitatively deduce them, by triangulation from the 
qualities of our acquaintance.48  
 
vi. What of awareness? I favour a higher-order thought theory, where a HOT’s 
suitably representing a sensory state constitutes that state’s being conscious.49 
We might envisage a panqualityist world, a web of qualities, with the HOT 
systems in brains, by representing other bits of these same brains, enabling 
consciousness of certain tiny portions of the material universe. Rosenthal’s 
notable insight regarding consciousness is that a conscious state is one the 
                                                        
47 Though the ultimate suggestion is of course that we drop the modality-based conceptual 
scheme if possible. 
48 Although it may be that some of the macroqualities we know of are also fundamental—but 
which ones and how to tell? Work to be done. I’ve written a little more about the deductive 
project mentioned here in Coleman 2015, but we await the genius. 
49 Thus I don’t find the objections to HOT theory mentioned in section I persuasive: no room to 
explain why, however. Rosenthal is also undaunted by the objections.  
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subject is aware of being in. This awareness is plausibly captured by the notion 
of mental representation of the conscious state, which swiftly leads to something 
like HOT theory.50 What the panqualityist incarnation has as advantage over 
conventionally physicalist HOT theory is the unreduced presence of qualities—
thus it has no need to account for the generation of qualities from the non-
qualitative, nor to eliminate qualities (as is, arguably, the practice of 
conventional HOT theory and its kin). The HOT component of panqualityism is 
(almost51) solely charged with producing subjective awareness of qualities. In 
section IV I tackle the abiding sense that a HOT-based account is not up to even 
this task; for now we leave the issue of awareness behind.   
 
vii. This HOT panqualityism has the resources to treat the unity and boundary 
problems. Now, if one’s qualitative states were made conscious by a set of HOTs 
directed at different elements, there would, as Chalmers notes,52 occur a problem 
as to how these qualitative elements became phenomenally unified—
experienced together. It wouldn’t follow from having this thought, and that one, 
about different qualities, that we had any thought about both qualities together. 
Yet we’re conscious of all and only what HOTs target. So we’d get no unified 
qualitative consciousness as a result. The solution is to posit a single very big 
HOT for each of us, at a time: a complex thought taking in all the qualities we’re 
synchronously aware of, perhaps a big conjunctive thought. Then we’ll 
                                                        
50 There are theories which make the higher-order representation more like perception than 
thought (see e.g. Lycan 2004). There’s also a self-representational view like Kriegel’s (2009), 
where the conscious state and the state that provides awareness of it are more tightly bound—
into the same metrological complex in fact. I prefer HOT theory for reasons explained elsewhere. 
51 See the next three subsections for a wrinkle on this claim. 
52 Bayne and Chalmers 2003.  
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experience all the relevant qualities together, and we have unity.53  
 
We also have boundaries: your HOT covers a certain range of qualities in your 
body, and those are the ones of which you’re conscious. Mine does likewise for a 
set in my body, which your HOT does not target: this is a simple matter of 
physiology. The relevant HO representation will likely require a non-trivial 
amount of neurological integration between representing and represented 
states.54 This ensures I can no more HO represent your sensory states than I can 
digest the alcohol you consumed last night. These states of yours are simply out 
of my reach. Since we are each conscious of all and only that which our 
respective HOT systems target, we’ll get two separate, bounded, unified fields of 
consciousness, on this model.  
 
If we envisage a universe-wide web of qualities, really one structured field, then 
the HOT systems we bear are cutters, chopping, in each case, a defined patch out 
of the overall web and producing awareness of it; hence generating subjects—
loci of awareness, each at the center of (i.e. phenomenally given) a bounded field 
of qualities. Panqualityism deals with the qualities of which we’re aware; the 
HOT component, as well as providing awareness at all, fixes the experiential field 
and its properties, like boundedness. It’s all too tempting to compare the HOT 
systems to spotlights, illuminating minute areas of the panqualityist universe.  
 
                                                        
53 James 1890: 158-9: ‘the sum [of experienced qualities] itself exists only for a bystander who 
happens to overlook the units and to apprehend the sum as such’. The bystander I propose is a 
HOT. Being appropriately related to a suitable HOT could perhaps be understood as a 
panqualityist version of a phenomenal bonding relation (after Goff 2009 and Chalmers).  
54 See Kriegel 2009 Ch. 7 for well-informed speculation about the kind of neurological 
integration likely required. 
 34 
viii. If the universe is a continuum at the microphysical level, this permits a 
considerable amount of graininess at the macrophysical level nonetheless. A 
neuron, for instance, will on the field conception show up as a node, or massive 
knot, in the universe’s quality-fabric. Though ultimately continuous with its 
surround, such a node can be treated for certain purposes—like those of 
measuring its electrical potential—as an isolated unit. Neurological accounts are 
framed in terms of the commerce among such units (together forming circuits 
and systems). So even in the panqualityist universe there remains a job to square 
this macrophysical graininess with the smoothness of experienced qualities, 
especially given the apparent importance of neuronal level goings-on to 
consciousness.55  
 
Rosenthal suggested several years ago that HOT theory might assist with the 
grain problem:  
 
‘The mental properties of our sensations appear ultimately 
homogeneous to us simply because the way we are 
conscious of them [i.e. the HO representation] smooths them 
out, so to speak, and elides the details of their particulate, 
bit-map nature.’56  
 
With a HOT and sensory state in play in a given case, the subject’s awareness is 
effectively placed at a little distance from its object. This creates just the space 
we need for a small appearance/reality gap. Without going so far as to declare 
                                                        
55 Though Sellars (1963: 37) seems open to the idea that ultimate homogeneity might by itself be 
enough to finesse the grain problem. In this case, the appeal to HOT theory below is not needed. 
It will still find gainful employment helping with structural mismatch, however (next subsection). 
56 1999: 345 
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that the state one is conscious of in reality lacks qualities,57 we have nevertheless 
the room to say it perhaps lacks the (macro-level) smoothness it appears in 
consciousness to possess. Thus the grain problem is finessed: we might claim 
that there is discontinuity at the macroexperiential level which does not show up 
in awareness thanks to the ‘clumping’ or smoothing effect of HOTs. This could 
work, in part, as follows. We are conscious of all and only that which our HOT 
targets. Thus if the HOT selectively targets discontinuous, even widely-
distributed, brain features, we will be conscious of these without the gaps, since 
the gaps are by hypothesis not targeted, hence not represented. Being conscious 
of these items without the gaps between them is to be conscious of them in a 
continuous field. Analogously, widely spaced TV cameras, focusing on distinct 
parts of a scene, supply a spatially continuous image on the television screen. 
What is not dealt with by this explanation is the microphysical grain within (in 
the constitution of) a given macrophysical brain portion (e.g. neuronal-activity 
node): why are we not conscious of its microqualitative texture? Perhaps this is a 
matter of the relatively low ‘resolution’ of HOTs.58  
 
So, although Lockwood avers that ‘no literal sense can be attached to the notion 
                                                        
57 This move becomes tempting to more mainstream materialists, once the idea arises of a 
mediating representational mechanism in introspection or consciousness. The first half of 
Pereboom’s 2011, for instance, toys with the idea that our phenomenal concepts are wholly 
deceptive, representing to us in introspection qualities that nowhere obtain. Yet how the content 
of such representations could be supplied is left unexplained. Against this view I juxtapose 
Sellars (1963: 30): ‘we have taken them [qualities] out of our world picture altogether. We will 
have made it unintelligible how things could even appear to be coloured.’ See also Coleman 2015.  
58 Or it may be that, taking note of the earlier model of qualitative combination, the constituting 
qualities of a given node exist now only as contributions to a whole which has taken the 
metaphysical upper hand. In this case, while the whole is in being, the composing qualities are 
only implicit within it, as regards their original form, and are not there literally to be observed or 
experienced, in this form. I leave this thought hanging, as it is not clear to me. It has obvious 
connection to Sellars’ line of thought in note 56. 
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of the conscious mind being distanced, in this fashion, from itself’,59 we can on 
HOT panqualityism in fact stand to the brain’s structure (in consciousness) 
somewhat as one does in viewing a newspaper photograph:60 we perceive not 
the ‘dots’, only the image.  
 
ix. Structural mismatch seems susceptible of similar treatment. Lockwood may 
be right that ‘what is ostensibly lacking…is even the most approximate 
isomorphism between states of awareness and the underlying physiological 
goings-on’61. But on HOT panqualityism, the requisite mirroring is not between 
what we are aware of and brain structure simpliciter, but between the HOT 
mechanism along with the sensory percept it carves up, and brain structure. 
Given a relatively ‘raw’ qualitative feed from the sensory systems, the HOT 
mechanism’s job is to complete the preparation of a percept fully ready for 
presentation to the subject (in awareness), and fit for the task of negotiating the 
world. It’s no surprise, given an environment of significant medium-scale dry 
goods (threats, food, etc.), that the HOT system should have evolved to ‘gloss 
over’ (in Lockwood’s phrase) the complexity, and amend the structure, of the 
pre-conscious raw qualitative feed; all in the cause of helpful isomorphism 
between the conscious percept and the subject’s environs, not her brain.62 This 
                                                        
59 1993: 278. Cf. Foster’s (1991: 127) talk of ‘distance’ from what is experienced. Foster doesn’t 
claim that taking such a distance is impossible, however; his main difficulty for Russellianism is 
what I have called the incommensurability problem.  
60 This is Lockwood’s analogy, which he claims does not carry over to the mental case (1993: 
277-8). 
61 1993: 274. Chalmers says ‘the macrophenomenal structure of my visual field is prima facie 
very different from the macrophysical structure of my brain’ (xx) 
62 Feigl (1958/1967: 91) also discusses this sort of proposal, attributing it to Carnap: ‘it would 
have to be assumed that one area of the cortex “taps” or “scans” other areas…Likewise, one 
would have to assume that the effect in the second [scanning] area reflects only certain gross 
 37 
corresponds, effectively, to Chalmers’ suggestion that the sought-after mirroring 
between experiential field and brain structure is at the informational level. The 
proposal is in the spirit of Lockwood’s observation that a functionalist account 
might have the wherewithal to abstract from the nitty-gritty of physical 
implementation when determining the structure of the conscious field. 
Lockwood dismisses the proposal because ‘Functionalism may have some 
plausibility in accounting for mental structure but, on the face of it, fails utterly 
to account for phenomenal content.’63 Yet this objection doesn’t touch two-
pronged HOT panqualityism, the right wing of which supplies qualitative content 
in unreduced form. The functionalist (HOT) unit swoops in only to supply, and 
regiment, awareness of this qualitative feed.64, 65, 66 
 
x. One’s natural next thought might be to wonder whether panpsychists could 
avail themselves of this useful HOT apparatus. Indeed they could. Panpsychists 
                                                                                                                                                              
features of the intricate and multifarious process patterns in the first…the second 
area…corresponds to the sensing of raw feels’. 
63 1993: 275. 
64 Lockwood arguably leaves consciousness open to such a flanking manoeuver: he says 
functionalism must fail ‘at least if put forward as a global theory of mind.’ (1993: 275, my 
emphasis). 
65 Chalmers (this volume, p.5) also thinks the structure of the modalities is a source of structural 
mismatch, but I’ve rejected the ultimate reality of that structure: I think it might well dissolve 
upon ideal refection.  
66 Chalmers identifies another troubling aspect of the structural mismatch problem: the notion 
that, given Russellianism, qualitative and physical property structures would have to match up. 
For example: ‘if mass has a scalar structure, the associated [quality] (what plays the mass role) 
has a scalar structure. If charge has a binary structure, the associated [quality] (what plays the 
charge role) has a binary structure’, this volume, p. 14. I have to admit to being bamboozled by 
this impressive difficulty. If there is a manifest structural clash here—at the moment I struggle to 
see whether there is or not—then my obvious remedy is to invoke the HOT apparatus again. 
Perhaps this ensures that the property structures we experience as belonging to qualities are 
somewhat artificial (the product of the HOT filtering process in preparing a percept). 
Unscreened, qualities perhaps have the structural properties of physical properties. Whether 
anything like this would work I don’t know. This is a very interesting problem indeed. I wonder 
how the matter would appear if we tried to match microqualities to individual vibration states of 
strings: would that produce any structural clash?  Like a string, I wave in the breeze here.  
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must anyway invoke some kind of special relation among sets of ultimates, 
superadded to their property of consciousness. For a panpsychist must explain— 
an underappreciated problem—why subjects are bounded as they are: we do not 
presumably experience all the conscious ultimates within our bodies; and even if 
we did, panpsychists respect commonsense ontology enough to carve us (human 
subjects) off from one another experientially. The panpsychist must therefore 
posit some relation that all and only the conscious ultimates comprising my 
consciousness stand in, likewise for you, and so on.67 What’s to prevent 
panpsychists adopting the HOT mechanism in its capacity as ‘cutter’? They might 
then also help themselves, it appears, to whatever power this supplement 
possesses when it comes to the grain and structural mismatch problems. 
 
Yet this move promises more harm than good for panpsychists, for it serves only 
to underscore the essential idleness of the posit of fundamental subjectivity. 
Having ultimate-subjects in play is thus revealed as doing nothing to help with 
understanding either the constitution (see section II), or (now) the structuring of 
a macro-subjectivity. Worse, in turning to the HOT mechanism to treat grain and 
structural mismatch, the panpsychist even outsources some of her account of the 
phenomenal state of macrosubjects. Theoretically more elegant panqualityism 
simply has the sort of relation a panpsychist might appeal to here do double duty 
for awareness. All that remains of panpsychism, by now, is the plaintive cry that 
without microsubjectivity we could not generate macrosubjectivity. But, as we saw, 
                                                        
67 It may be tempting, but it would be no less question begging, to say the relation is constitution: 
that the ultimates you are conscious of are the ones that constitute your conscious mind. The 
whole question is in virtue of what do these conscious ultimates not also constitute mine. Goffian 
phenomenal bonding, at least as presently understood, is of no help either: to say a certain set of 
ultimates are phenomenally bonded is to say that they are the ones co-conscious for some 
subject; this is just to describe the state of affairs that requires explaining in independent terms.  
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this thought is a dead end: the addition of microsubjectivity did not help in 
accounting for macrosubjects.  
 
 
IV.  
i. The foregoing discussion suggests the potential value of HOT representation, in 
combination with panqualityism, when it comes to treating some of the more 
intimidating combination problems.68 But this promise is for naught if there’s 
reason to think that awareness cannot be analysed by higher-order thought. The 
slippage between sensory states and awareness provided by the HOT 
mechanism, and the structuring it offers of the contents of awareness, appear 
conditional on HOTs sufficing for awareness in the first place. But Chalmers 
avers that any such attempt to ‘functionalise’ awareness must fail, since it will 
face its own variety of zombie.  
 
The relevant zombie argument starts from a panqualityist world-description: a 
quality web, including (or implying) the functional structures in brains that 
implement HOTs about the qualities in somatosensory cortexes. We would 
entertain all of this, yet find we could still conceive that the creatures thereby 
described lacked awareness of the qualities in their brains. Conceivability 
entailing possibility, this means the failure of HOT panqualityism. Perhaps the 
theory can get qualities into the sort of order to match what we know, but it 
                                                        
68  Lockwood maintains that ‘there are no distinctively introspective meta-mental 
representations…whose separation from their mental objects could help us resolve…the grain 
problem’ (1993: 278). Aside from the reference to introspection—HOTs do their representation 
in ‘first-order’ consciousness—this is the gist of the present HOT-based proposal: I’ve no idea 
why Lockwood rules it out. His claim appears to be an empirical one.  
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cannot account for our awareness of qualities. Note well: we should distinguish 
this argument from the standard zombie argument concerning phenomenal 
consciousness. That argument invokes zombies who lack sensory qualities and 
who lack also awareness of those qualities. In our case panqualityism guarantees 
that our material duplicates instantiate sensory qualities; what’s allegedly 
missing is their awareness of these qualities. They are awareness zombies.  
 
I will analyse and reject Chalmers’ grounds for the claim that HOT panqualityism 
is threatened by awareness zombies. This leaves the positive motivations for the 
theory unobstructed. 
 
ii. Why does Chalmers consider that panqualityist awareness zombies are 
conceivable? With standard physical zombies, who lack phenomenal 
consciousness, Chalmers emphasises that the physical consists of structure and 
dynamics. One is thus prompted to conceive of a pure structure-and-dynamics-
world, and sure enough finds that consciousness needn’t be instantiated. In our 
case the bit of supplementary theory, aimed to get us conceiving in the right 
direction,69 is that:  
 
‘Awareness involves phenomenology, and there are good reasons 
to think that no mere functional state can constitute 
                                                        
69 I’m not saying there’s anything wrong with such prompting: to set up a zombie argument 
properly, explanandum and explanans must be made precise enough for the thinker to conceive 
informatively. If we are not told to conceive of the physical in terms of structure and dynamics, 
our conception of the physical is left too open-ended. That’s plausibly why some people react to 
the standard zombie argument by saying it’s inconceivable that all the physical stuff could be 
there without consciousness, since consciousness just is part of the physical stuff: they haven’t 
had (or heeded) the prompt about structure and dynamics. It’s very hard to imagine that 
consciousness just is structure and dynamics. Note that here the prompting primarily concerns 
the nature of the explanandum (awareness, that it has phenomenology) whereas with the 
standard zombie argument it primarily concerns the explanans (the nature of the physical). 
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phenomenology…one can conceive of any such functional state 
in the absence of phenomenology, and in particular in the 
absence of awareness.’70  
 
The anti-HOT panqualityism zombie argument is thus to operate much like the 
anti-physicalist zombie argument—it hangs on a failure to reductively capture a 
certain phenomenology. In our case the missing target is narrower than 
phenomenology in general—the target of standard zombies. Chalmers apparently 
holds that, in addition to being aware of sensory qualities, we’re aware of our 
awareness of sensory qualities. This further object of awareness—awareness 
itself—comes with its own patch of phenomenology: a qualitative feel. It’s this 
feel which our HOT-panqualitative duplicates are alleged conceivably to lack.71  
 
It might seem an odd move to press the lack of a certain qualitative content 
against panqualityism. At this point in the dialectic, couldn’t the panqualityist 
reply just by building the allegedly missing qualities into our, hence our HOT-
panqualityist duplicates’, constitution? Not quite—for recall that the HOT-
panqualityist position is that awareness is supplied by higher-order thought. It 
follows that if specific sensory qualities attach to awareness, these must be 
provided by the HOT component of panqualityism. And a HOT is avowedly a 
‘mere functional state’. So Chalmers’ objection is well founded.72  
                                                        
70 This volume p. 24, my emphasis. 
71 Interestingly, then, this argument doesn’t seem directly to concern the irreducibility of 
awareness as such. Rather, the idea is that awareness necessarily comes with a phenomenal 
complement. Since the complement is unanalysable, awareness must also be unanalysable, as the 
complement is bound up with it. See also the next note.  
72 Still, one might wonder just why Chalmers proceeds via phenomenology in this way. Why does 
he not simply claim directly that awareness isn’t functionalisable? The answer is that zombie 
scenarios depend on there being a sensory quality ‘toggle’ between the actual world and putative 
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iii. I believe the objection fails, however. It’s true that if awareness had 
phenomenology, then this, like sensory quality in general, would be hard to 
functionalise.73 But I deny that mere awareness has phenomenology.74  
 
That awareness might lack phenomenology doesn’t appear terribly surprising, 
when considered as a general matter: It is via awareness that we encounter 
sensory qualities and the appearances of things, but why should the faculty that 
presents sensory qualities to us itself make some appearance among our sensory 
                                                                                                                                                              
zombie world. One conceives of the relevant ‘zombified’ property by conceiving of the absence of 
its associated sensory qualities (e.g. zombie water is H2O without waterish sensory qualities, 
zombie heat is MKE without heatish sensory qualities; the thrust of the standard zombie 
argument is that removal of its associated sensory qualities amounts to removal of the very 
property in the case of phenomenal consciousness). It’s not possible to construct a zombie 
scenario without framing the target or explanandum in sensory quality terms, in fact (this is also 
true of the explanans, but showing why that is would take us too far afield). It follows that any 
item not associated with a set of sensory qualities is not a valid target for a zombie argument. 
Setting aside its structural impact on the experiential field, which should be deducible from the 
brain’s functional structure, awareness is one such item, I argue below. However, this excursion 
into the general mechanics of zombie arguments is not needed to block Chalmers: his present 
anti-panqualityist argument depends on the explicit claim that awareness has phenomenology; in 
the interesting (i.e. not-merely-structuring) sense, I deny this.  
73 In fact my diagnosis of the standard zombie argument is that it depends much more on the 
elusiveness of qualities to functionalisation, than it does on the elusiveness of sheer 
consciousness (a.k.a. awareness). There is evidence for this in how the argument is sometimes 
put. Churchland (2014: 37), for example, describes zombies as our physical duplicates, ‘whose 
subjective qualitative mental life is simply absent’—significantly, he doesn’t mention 
consciousness at all in setting up the zombie challenge to physicalism. This point is implicit in 
Byrne 2006. See also previous note.  
74 In the sense of being associated with sensory qualities—it has no ‘feel’. We did admit (III, viii-
ix) an impact of the HOT mechanism on our sensory qualities—for it has a ‘smoothing’ and 
structuring effect. But these structural aspects of our phenomenology, I maintain, ought to be 
recoverable from details of the HOT system’s interaction with its sensorily qualitative target 
among our brain tissues—these explanations would be on a par with those which might be given 
of the boundedness and unity of our HOT panqualityist duplicates’ experiential fields, also via the 
HOT mechanism. While the functional HOT mechanism cannot manufacture sensory qualities, as 
Chalmers rightly points out, it is able effectively to corral and to filter existing sensory quality 
instances (to use a metaphor, though HOTs can mould the clay they’re given, they cannot produce 
the qualitative clay itself). We thus do not get any zombie-susceptible aspects of phenomenology.  
N.b. If he did not (at least implicitly) accept that the HOT mechanism could be a priori connected 
to the structure of phenomenology, it seems that Chalmers could not have run the objection we 
encountered when discussing phenomenal unity: that multiple HOTs would prevent the unity of 
consciousness. In that objection, he infers from HOT-structure to phenomenological structure.  
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qualities?75 That would be akin to the camera appearing in the periphery of 
every shot of a television show.76 It seems that there at least could be creatures 
for whom awareness contributed no sensory contents. For them, consciousness 
would be completely ‘transparent’ to its first-order objects. Prima facie, 
therefore, it is an open question whether we are such creatures. We must 
examine the evidence.   
 
iv. In claiming that awareness lacks phenomenology, I deny that we are aware of 
awareness.77 Were we aware of awareness, we could expect such second-order 
awareness to have phenomenology, 78  and Chalmers’ strategy would be 
vindicated. A lot hangs on this issue: Chalmers seems to concede79 that a 
deflationary account of awareness could combine with an ‘informational’ 
structuring of awareness to finesse such things as the structural mismatch 
problem. His objection to this strategy rests on the alleged difficulty of analysing 
awareness, which rests in turn on his claim that awareness has phenomenology. 
 
                                                        
75 This is not the denial that awareness is real (the view Chalmers ascribes to James in his radical 
empiricist phase): of course we are aware of qualities. But we are, in the relevant sense (see note 
86), unaware of our awareness of qualities.  
76 Or the eyes appearing in the visual field—cf. Wittgenstein in Tractatus. 
77  Lockwood says: ‘sensory phenomenology belongs, so to speak, to that tip of the 
neurophysiological iceberg which projects above the surface of awareness. We are to regard it as a 
part or aspect of the reality of the brain that is directly present to the conscious mind’   (1993: 
282, my emphasis). My position is implicit here: sensory qualities project above the surface of 
awareness, but awareness itself need not so project. Strictly, we are not even aware of awareness 
(i.e. the HOT mechanism) as structuring our sensory field: for being aware only of the effects of 
some item is not the same as being aware of that item. As Kriegel says, something that structures 
phenomenology ‘makes a difference to the phenomenology—without being an item in it.’ (2009: 
172). 
78 It seems that if we are aware of some x, then x is like something for us, in the Nagelian sense. 
That means in turn that x is associated with certain sensory qualities. How could we be aware of 
x—in the sense relevant to consciousness—without x being like something for us? 
79 This volume, pp. 29-30. 
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Faced with the claim that awareness has phenomenology, a sensible approach is 
to search for its quality in consciousness. Kriegel posits a distinctive, pervasive 
and diffuse ‘feel’ contributed by awareness to our overall field of conscious 
sensory qualities.80 But he is no more specific than this, and I don’t recognise the 
phenomenology in question from this description.81 
 
Chalmers refers us to some examples of the phenomenology of awareness which 
he employs elsewhere.82 I understand, however, that he doesn’t wish to hang too 
much on these particular cases, relying instead on what he sees as the 
plausibility of the general claim that we’re aware of awareness. Accordingly I 
won’t directly examine his examples; I’ll only say that in each case where it is 
plausible that a distinctive phenomenology obtains, it’s at least as plausible that 
it attaches (or is felt to attach) to the object of experience, or to things like qualia 
of mental effort, not to the manner of experiencing.  
 
Some phenomenological reflection, for what it’s worth (the difficulty of 
adjudicating this sort of dispute is inversely proportional with its proximity to 
                                                        
80 See his 2009. Similarly, Chalmers talks of a phenomenal ‘background acquaintance with our 
awareness’ (2013: 5). 
81 Gennaro (e.g. 2008) cannot locate the phenomenology of awareness either. See Kriegel 2009 
Ch. 5 for an ingenious explanation of why the phenomenology is elusive to introspection. This 
explanation, however, does not help with the fact (as I see it) that the phenomenology is not felt 
in a first-order way, as it had better be. We don’t—can’t—require introspection to confirm the 
presence of all the qualities we’re aware of. Is it only by introspecting my experience that I know 
I sometimes see blue? This seems an unnecessarily technical requirement to verify my occasional 
awareness of blue. And this, that introspection is required to confirm the existence of a sensory 
quality, is not something Kriegel can anyway say: for since the feel of awareness is said to elude 
introspection, yet Kriegel claims to feel this feel, these must be phenomenological data outside of 
introspection he’s relying on. I don’t have those data. All of which indicates, additionally, in my 
view, that something is seriously wrong with the prevalent talk of ‘introspection’ – I have come to 
lose more or less entirely my grip on what this operation is supposed, phenomenologically and 
mechanically, to comprise—is it much more than staring very hard at a wall while mentally 
muttering the inanity ‘This is an experience’?  
82 In his reply to Hellie’s commentary on Chalmers’ The Character of Consciousness (Chalmers 
2013). 
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the raw experience; indeed one might have imagined disagreement impossible at 
this distance, but quite the contrary). In being aware of red, I just don’t know 
what my alleged awareness of my awareness of red is meant to feel like; I find 
only the redness. When you ask me to attend to the relational property of my 
being aware of the redness, still all I find is the redness—I don’t seem to enter the 
picture (in respect of that redness). Of course I know I’m aware of redness, since 
there it is for me, subjectively. Similarly, I know there’s a camera shooting a 
television scene, although I can’t see the camera, only its output.83  
 
I think, strange as it may sound, that we infer that we’re aware, because there are 
qualities present to us subjectively. One feels the qualities, but not that which 
goes into one’s feeling them. This addresses the challenge sometimes leveled 
against those who reject the awareness of awareness: If we’re unaware of 
awareness, how could we possibly know that we’re aware?84  This is a strange 
question, however. We who reject second-order awareness accept awareness. 
Awareness is the subjective presence to one of qualities. Now, since we accept 
awareness, we accept that qualities are subjectively present to individuals. Those 
individuals, in noting the qualities of which they’re aware, can make the trivial 
(though undoubtedly important) inference that they’re aware.85  
                                                        
83 Or I know there’s an eye because the visual field is apparent to me. In fact the relationship is 
tighter in the case of awareness than in these examples: if I am dreaming then the visual 
experiences I have do not (at that time) require an eye, at least not in the normal way. But if 
sensory qualities are apparent to me at all, that is because of my awareness.  
84 See e.g. Kriegel 2009 Ch. 4.3 for this sort of challenge. 
85 In Dretske’s terms (see e.g. his 1999), we’re aware that we’re aware, but not aware of 
awareness – this is the distinction between fact awareness and object/property awareness. But 
mere fact awareness isn’t what Chalmers has in mind in alleging a phenomenology of awareness 
– Dretske is clear that this kind of awareness is a phenomenology-free affair, in the sense that we 
can become that-aware concerning some fact just by reading about it. The fact about which we’re 
thereby aware need communicate nothing phenomenologically. The (property) awareness of 
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v. Those who allege a feel to awareness are not making things up: they surely 
detect something, phenomenologically. The question is what it is that they detect. 
It seems a distinct possibility, for the skeptical, that they’re misclassifying some 
more or less subtle feature (or features) of ‘first-order’ phenomenology. There 
are indeed some phenomenological factors with a tendency to confound. For 
instance, since one can infer that one is aware, there is the feel of the (pretty 
routine) conscious thought ‘I am aware’. There is also the feel of ‘self-awareness’: 
the conscious sensory qualities associated with one’s own body and mind 
(including the feels of prevailing emotional tenor, of bodily pains, of intentions, 
wishes, memories). Given these two items, it follows that one can be aware of 
oneself as a thing that is aware. Is there anything to the alleged sensory quality of 
awareness beyond this feeling? But this is not a phenomenology of awareness. It 
doesn’t require awareness itself to be conscious, any more than being aware of 
myself as a thing that is watching a show shot by TV cameras requires me to see 
the cameras.86 
                                                                                                                                                              
sensory qualities which we are (fact) aware (i.e. know) that we possess need therefore involve 
no qualitative feel itself.  
86 Or, perhaps more simply, any more than being aware of myself as a thing that is watching 
requires me to see my eyes.  
Objection: Yet we do sometimes see eyes and TV cameras, and that’s how we know they’re there; do 
we sometimes, then, become aware of awareness (in ‘introspection’)?  
Reply: Because awareness is so tightly connected with qualities being subjectively there for one 
at all, there’s no need, in this case, to observe the organ ‘from the outside’. I really doubt there’s 
much to introspection, beyond, perhaps, thinking about the qualities one is aware of. But any 
sensory (or cognitive) qualities accruing to such thoughts, beyond the qualities of their sensory 
objects, are not contents the HOT apparatus is charged with generating, so no objection to HOT 
panqualityism lies in this direction. The HOT component’s job is to produce first-order 
awareness. It follows that I deny, against Rosenthal, that HOTs can take other HOTs as objects 
(this is Rosenthal’s model of introspection).  
In fact there is not even an objection here that might affect the reply to Chalmers. If we could be 
introspectively aware of awareness (which I deny), that would involve a HOT targeting another 
HOT, which was targeting in turn certain ‘floor-level’ sensory qualities. If ‘awareness’ contributed 
sensory qualities to consciousness here, those would be qualities pertaining to the ‘lower’ HOT, 
the target of the meta-HOT. But of course HOTs do have qualities, because they are simply neural 
 47 
 
vi. There’s also a serious question concerning what the sensory content of the 
alleged feel of awareness could even be. Proponents seem clear that this feel is an 
additional sensory content beyond the other qualities one is aware of (those 
pertaining to the environment, one’s body, thoughts etc.).87 Now, we may ask, 
does this extra ingredient have its own, ‘isolated’, feel—is it a standalone 
qualitative ingredient in consciousness; or, is its feel somehow interpenetrated 
by the other, first-order, qualities of which one is aware? Problems arise either 
way. If awareness has its own distinctive feel, which qualitatively-speaking has 
nothing to do with, and makes no reference to, the other, first-order, qualities, 
then it is very hard to see how, in experiencing this quality, one could apprehend 
it as a feeling of awareness of these (first-order) qualities, i.e. as the very item it is 
supposed to be. Advocates of the phenomenology of awareness purport to be 
identifying it by its conscious feel. But this colourlessness would presumably 
have rendered the feel of awareness of first-order qualities unidentifiable as such, 
and likely wholly mysterious: a detached phenomenal UFO.  
 
So it seems that the feel of awareness must somehow be suffused with the 
qualities that the awareness is of—the first-order qualities pertaining to 
                                                                                                                                                              
items, and on panqualityism all neural items (all items in fact) are constituted of qualities. These 
qualities are not (per impossibile) produced by a HOT’s functional aspect, they rather realise or 
carry that very aspect (compare: a mousetrap is not of this configuration of wood because it’s a 
mousetrap, but vice-versa). So there would be no difficulty with a HOT contributing qualities to 
consciousness, were it the object of a further HOT whose functional property made the former 
HOT conscious. I simply deny, on phenomenological grounds, that this occurs, however.  
87 E.g. Kriegel (2009: 180). It seems the feel of awareness couldn’t very well be an ‘aspect’ 
independently added to each first-order quality of which one is aware: then in seeing a red rose 
one would have ‘red-rose-plus-my-awareness’ phenomenology; but this is not how red roses 
appear: they just appear red and rose-y. The popular doctrine of the transparency of experience 
(see e.g. Harman 1990) could never have got up and running, were the feel of awareness an 
aspect of every first-order sensory content.  
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experience of the environment, body, mind etc.88 Then, at least, it exhibits to 
consciousness the intimate connection which it bears to these qualities. But now 
the position appears to be this: I am aware of a set of first-order qualities, and 
aware, additionally, of an awareness-quale that phenomenally includes reference 
to (is ‘stained by’) these same first-order qualities. It seems to follow that I get 
every first-order quality twice in consciousness: once in its own right (as a ‘floor-
level item’, in Kriegel’s phrase), and once more as ‘staining’ the feel of my 
awareness of all these first-order qualities. This duplication is unavoidable, since 
the sensory quality of awareness is posited as an item additional to the first-
order qualities, while containing, in its feel (where else?), reference to them. Yet, 
while I cannot locate the feel of awareness, I am certain that I don’t have this 
doubling of qualities in my experience. The feel of awareness is here construed 
as a kind of mirror, giving reflection of every quality presented to it. I do not have 
this mirror, only its putative objects. 89  Either my phenomenology (or 
‘introspection’) is atypical, or there’s some confusion it seems in the doctrine of 
the feel of awareness. 
 
vii. If awareness lacks phenomenology, as I have suggested, then there is not a 
distinctive kind of sensory quality that the HOT apparatus must contribute to 
consciousness. Awareness is as it were behind the lens.90 This means that, as 
                                                        
88 This is in fact the line Kriegel (2009: 180) takes. 
89 Even if it’s in the phenomenological background, as Kriegel says, a faint mirroring or 
duplication there must nonetheless (phenomenally) be. 
90 This metaphorical location permits it of course its structuring effect on phenomenology. 
Another plausible example of such a phenomenon is memory. Memory is not behind the lens but 
below the surface as regards appearances. Like awareness, all we get from memory is (delivery 
of) some items of which we are aware, but memory itself makes no appearance in terms of 
sensory content. To be sure, there is a feel to trying to remember, also a feeling of having 
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against Chalmers, there is no phenomenological residue left unanalysed by HOT 
panqualityism.91 While there is good reason to doubt that any sensory quality 
could be a purely functional affair, there is no such reason to doubt that 
awareness itself, unassociated with any sensory quality, could be a functional 
property. For all we presently know, higher-order thought may be the correct 
analysis.92, 93 
 
V.  
i. I conclude that 1). The subject combination problem reveals a deep lack of 
theoretical motivation for panpsychism. 2). Panqualityism, with the addition of a 
HOT apparatus for awareness, has the resources to make serious inroads into 
the non-subject combination problems. 3). Chalmers gives us no reason to doubt 
the adequacy of the sort of functional analysis of awareness offered by HOT 
theory.  
 
ii. It seems that if constitutive Russellian positions enjoy significant advantages 
                                                                                                                                                              
successfully recalled, but the memory process itself—what comes in between these conscious 
events—is wholly obscure to awareness. 
91 For I claim that the structuring aspects of the HOT system will be deducible—given details of 
the qualitative clay on which it is to effect its moulding, naturally.  
92 Objection: If there is no phenomenology of awareness to be theoretically analysed, how could the 
earlier critique of panpsychism rest on its inadequacy as a theoretical analysis of 
macrosubjectivity? Cannot panpsychism evade critique in the same way HOT panqualityism does? 
Reply: Panpsychism’s failure really consisted in an inability to say anything useful about the 
constitution and structure of macrosubjects, in particular, about why they have the unity and 
boundaries they do. By contrast, one of HOT panqualityism’s strengths is the explanation it can 
provide of these features. The accusation against panpsychism was never that it could not 
account for awareness as such, since this it simply presupposed! 
93 It will likely be said that it remains perfectly conceivable that our HOT-panqualityist 
duplicates might lack awareness. But as awareness has no proprietary sensory quality associated 
with it, I’m simply unsure what someone could be conceiving of who made this claim, since 
zombie-style conceiving requires a sensory quality toggle between the actual world and the 
relevant zombie world—some qualitative content that we can subtract, in conception, from the 
zombie world. In this sense, ‘awareness zombies’ are inconceivable.   
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over mainstream physicalism and dualism,94 then, given its advantages over 
panpsychism, panqualityism has a fair claim to be our best hope for a theory of 
consciousness. 
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